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THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
INTER-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE
RUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS—BUCHAREST, 20-25 JUNE 1960

The background of the dispute (1957-1960)

1. The present dispute between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) has its origins in differences ^{about} [between the two parties] which date back ~~at least~~ ^{about} three years; that is, to ~~the period~~ ^{the period} mid-1957. On the Chinese side, antecedent resentments may date as far back as the formative period of the CPC in the twenties, when Stalin's ^{of} alliance policy with the Kuomintang drove the CPC to disaster, as well as to the war and early post-war period, when Soviet support for the Chinese Communist cause was minimal and did not inhibit the stripping of Manchuria. ^{There is clearly no} [If there is a] single cause for the current dispute, [it is not known.] Rather, it would appear, [there was] an accumulation of Chinese policies and actions [which] increasingly displeased and challenged Khrushchev and, presumably, a majority of the Soviet leadership. In the field of domestic policy, it is now known that Mao's "Let a hundred flowers bloom" program aroused Soviet doubts about its usefulness. The ^{beginning in early 1958,} program for the "great leap forward" and the communes, adopted by the CPC in May 1958, ^{was} readily recognizable as a considerable irritant in Sino-Soviet relations by the ^{then} militant treatment which it received in the Soviet Union.

2. Disagreement over foreign policy manifested itself in August 1958 when Khrushchev, after four days ^{of} discussion with Mao Tse-tung, ^{publicly} rejected, on 5 August, Western proposals for a summit meeting within the U. N. Security

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Council on the crisis in the Middle East - proposals which he had accepted in July. Nevertheless, on 23 August the Chinese began shelling of the off-shore islands. On 23 May 1958, the Commander of the Chinese Air Force predicted that China would make atomic bombs "in the not too distant future", and the Chinese press ceased to refer to Khrushchev's earlier plan for an atom-free zone in Asia. Khrushchev revived his concept of an atom-free zone for "the Far East and the entire Pacific Basin" at the 21st CPSU Congress in February 1959. Chinese reactions were not enthusiastic, and, from April 1959, on, references to the plan disappeared altogether. In the light of these and other indications, it can be fairly assumed that Soviet unwillingness to deliver atomic weapons to Chinese controls had become a serious issue. It is now known that the Soviets cited as the reason for their reluctance their apprehension over Chinese ^{pronouncements} policies in the external field which were in conflict with Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" tactics, ^{which} affirmed that global or limited war need not be avoided, and ^{which} objected to Khrushchev's aid programs for "bourgeois" regimes in underdeveloped countries on the grounds that they would delay revolution. Chinese objections to peaceful coexistence tactics manifested themselves from about 1957 on in the ^{deliberations} of the International Communist Front organizations, especially within the World Peace Council and the International Union of Students--two organizations which were most directly and intensely engaged in building their appeal on the unity campaign so typical of the peaceful coexistence period. ^{They} desired to involve bourgeois and nationalist

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groups in mass action and therefore advocated informal conversations, and negotiations with them, and the making of concessions to such groups. The Chinese refused to "sit around the table" with them except in formal meetings with designated representatives and refused to broaden the scope of concessions on program and organization questions. Chinese opposition was particularly manifest after the Soviet decision of June 1959 concerning Khrushchev's visit to the United States.

3. In August 1959, the Chinese overran the Indian border post at Longju and reopened the border dispute with India, after eight years of quiet. The Soviet position on this dispute significantly failed to give full endorsement to the Chinese claims, although preceding Chinese repressive actions in Tibet had been promptly supported as just and as an "internal affair." Khrushchev, as was known later, did not interpret the reopening of the dispute as a mere attempt to register opposition to his trip to the United States, but as an un-Marxist blunder which needlessly undermined Indian neutralist attitudes and potential value in the peace and disarmament campaign and impaired the appeal of CP India. When Khrushchev visited Peiping, after his trip to the United States, for the October anniversary celebrations in 1959, the Sino-Indian dispute was one topic of discussion and it is virtually certain that Khrushchev presented his views on improving USSR-U.S. relations. Sino-Soviet discussions were, however, unsatisfactory and no communique was published. According to three widely separated and reliable sources, in October 1959 the CPSU sent a letter to at least the bloc parties, holding fast to Khrushchev's views on USSR-U.S. relations. In November 1959,

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of CPSU, published an article in Problems of Peace and Socialism that justified the policy of peaceful coexistence as "class struggle on the international plane" and significantly noted Lenin's criticism of "Left Communists." It is known that the Chinese have since been accused of criticizing the November 1959 joint program of the European parties, which is clearly based upon the same premises as the article. In December 1959, Khrushchev warned the Chinese in stating at the Hungarian Party Congress that "we must all synchronize our watches."

4. In January 1960, the Chinese positions hardened. At ^{the} Rome meeting of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council in January 1960 it transpired that the Chinese had charged the USSR with seeking to isolate China in the interest of achieving a modus vivendi with the U. S. A reliable source states that the USSR in January 1960 informally breached the idea that the Sino-Soviet differences required discussion, only to be told by the Chinese that the differences were between the parties and should not be mentioned. The CPC appears to have reached important decisions during January which had a major effect on the dispute. On 21 January the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted a resolution concerning disarmament which specified that China would only be bound by treaties it takes part in framing, and in February 1960, at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries, the Chinese observer, K'ang Sheng, incorporated the statement in his speech, broadening it to include "all international agreements." The contrast between the descriptions of the world situation in K'ang Sheng's speech and those given by the European bloc speakers was striking.

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5. It is at this point that the 1957 Moscow declaration first began to be quoted to support the conflicting positions, when the People's Daily of 6 February 1960 asserted that "the development of the international situation has borne out the correctness of the declaration." It appears likely, therefore, that the Chinese decided in late January to take the initiative in broadening the debate. But also on 6 February a verbal message from the Central Committee of the CPSU was reportedly delivered in Peiping, asking the CPC to attend a meeting to discuss outstanding problems.

6. In mid-April 1960 the Chinese took advantage of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth to make their most serious public attack on the theoretical innovations developed by the CPSU at and after the XXth Party Congress in January 1956. Using oblique but unmistakable arguments, the Chinese challenged the premises underlying Soviet foreign policy and by implication disparaged Khrushchev's stature as a Communist theorist. The Chinese attack comprised three major statements: two articles in the party's theoretical monthly Red Flag (issues no. 7 and 8, 1 and 16 April), the first entitled "On Imperialism as the Source of War in Modern Times" and the second entitled "Long Live Leninism," ^{as well as} and an editorial on 22 April in the authoritative newspaper, the People's Daily.

7. The Soviets replied in the speech delivered in Moscow on 22 April by Otto Kuusinen of the CPSU Central Committee and Secretariat. A very strong defense of current Soviet foreign policy and of the general lines endorsed at the XXth and XXth CPSU Congresses, his speech confined its critical comments to general statements condemning "dogmatic positions

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as backward positions." On the same day a Chinese Politburo alternate, Lu Ting-i, gave a speech in Peiping which incorporated many of the arguments of the "Long Live Leninism" article. The divergences between the two speeches were so great that when one Communist party seriously affected by the dispute, the Indian party, published both speeches side by side in the 8 May issue of its newspaper New Age, without comments, its action aroused considerable comment and created confusion among party members.

8. The Chinese then began to carry their case to the other parties. "Long Live Leninism," the Lu Ting-i speech, and the People's Daily editorial of 22 April were translated and published in the widely circulated English language Peking Review of 26 April. At the same time, the first edition of a book containing the three articles was produced by the Foreign Languages Press in Peiping in many languages for distribution abroad. Two further editions of this book were produced, one in May and the other, after the Bucharest confrontations, in August. The book is known to exist in English, Spanish, French, the Eastern European languages (including Russian), and Vietnamese. It has been distributed in India and in certain countries at least of Latin America and Western Europe. It appears that the Chinese later attempted to circulate the articles in the USSR in one of their two Russian language publications, Drushba, an action which the Soviets protested. The magazine was in fact suspended from circulation in the USSR after the publication of the June issue. Earlier instances of Soviet refusals to circulate Chinese doctrinal writings in the USSR have recently been reported by reliable sources, who heard the details during party discussions of the Sino-Soviet differences.

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9. After the Kumsinen rebuttal of Chinese charges, the CPSU took advantage of the 40th anniversary of the publication of Lenin's book Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder (10 June 1960) to carry the public ideological debate with the Chinese to new heights, including the use of the charge of "deviation." Two Soviet articles published on 10 June, one by D. Shevlyagin in the newspaper Soviet Russia and one by N. Matkovsky in the party newspaper Pravda, expressed this criticism by attacking "contemporary left-wing deviationism" in terms which referred to the positions held by the Chinese party. Both articles highlighted the significance of the 12 Party Declaration of November 1957. Matkovsky characterized it as a "programmatic document of the international Communist movement," and as a validation of the general line expressed by the CPSU. Shevlyagin, on the other hand, referred particularly to the declaration as authorizing and requiring a struggle against "leftist opportunism" as well as against "rightist opportunism," such as that of the Yugoslavs. In discussing manifestations of left opportunism he made the significant point that "not only groups of Communists but the leadership of individual parties have veered into leftist deviationism." Neither of the articles explicitly identified the Chinese as the target of criticism, but their relevance to the dispute was unmistakable.

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10. The timing of this intensification of the Soviet attack on the Chinese views coincides with a CPSU letter on the Summit Conference which was circulated, shortly after Khrushchev's return home following the collapse of the conference, to the Communist parties of the bloc and those of France and Italy. Although the text of this letter is not available, it seems likely

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to have been unacceptable to the Chinese, who emphasized from mid-May on that the course of events before and at Paris proved the validity of the Chinese arguments concerning imperialism and the illusory and fruitless character of negotiation. Perhaps the worst offense of the Chinese, in Soviet eyes, was their argument that the only value of Communist participation in such peace negotiations was the purely tactical advantage that came out of their eventual exposure of the true character and intentions of the enemy. This observation was precisely the kind of statement which the CPSU was most eager to avert.

11. It is likely too that the CPSU decided at this time to send a sharp letter of criticism to the CPC. One prominent Free World Communist who visited Moscow in late May stated that he learned from a member of the CPSU Secretariat that a "sharp" letter was being sent to the CPC. ^{2 June and on} CPSU letters calling for a conference was reportedly sent to the Chinese on 7 June, and ^{and} it appears likely that the letter of 2 June was the "sharp" one. It is also worth noting that the CPC leaders went into closed conference in Shanghai on 8 June, a move which may well have been prompted by the receipt of the ^{two} CPSU letters. They were in fact still meeting when the Chinese delegation left for the Bucharest party congress.

12. The Chinese too made a major move in the now rapidly developing dispute. They did ^{so} this in early June at the XIth General Council meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peiping. On 2 June they presented an ultimatum on the official WFTU report to the chief Soviet representative, who rejected it. The Chinese claimed that the report contained ^{objectionable} impressionable

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attacks on the communes. At this meeting, which opened on 5 June after a five-day delay, in the presence of both WFTU affiliates and representatives of some twenty-five unaffiliated national trade union federations, the leading Chinese figures Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-ch'i, Liu Ning-i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Liu Chang-sheng publicized the Chinese views on the peace struggle, the threat of imperialism, and the "illusions" aroused by the campaigns for peaceful coexistence and by programs for giving substantial economic aid to bourgeois-led underdeveloped countries. Using a tactic they had employed earlier in April, the Chinese leaders accompanied these criticisms with fulsome expressions of approval of the Soviet posture towards the U.S. at the time of the collapse of the Summit Conference. This approval of the Soviet actions was accompanied by expressions of solidarity with the USSR in its stand against U.S. acts of aggression. It was learned that the CPSU was particularly stung by the speeches of Liu Ning-i and Liu Chang-sheng.

13. When the Chinese convened a private meeting of Communist party members among the delegates to hear a statement of the Chinese criticisms of CPSU doctrines, representatives of the CPSU promptly opposed the continuation of the talks and made the ominous charge that the Chinese action was a violation of the terms of the 12 Party Declaration of November 1957. This Soviet appeal to the authority of the Moscow declaration paralleled the similar appeal in the Shevlyagin article published in Moscow, and the charge has since figured prominently in the CPSU's presentation of its case. According to credible reports, during the WFTU session Teng Hsiao-p'ing, general secretary of the CPC, accused the CPSU in turn of "throwing the Moscow declaration overboard."

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representatives in Peiping not only criticized the Chinese actions in personal discussions with foreign Communist representatives, but by 9 June took concrete steps to enlist the support of other CP's against the Chinese. The representative of one Free World CP was told, by a representative of the Soviet All Union Central Council of Trade Unions, that the Soviet embassy in Peiping was interested in knowing if he could stop over in Moscow after the end of the conference.

15. When a group of European and African delegates to the WFTU meeting arrived in Moscow on 13 June, a number of CPSU officials conferred with members of this group. One of the delegates in the group is known to have talked privately with a top official, V. Tereshkin, of the CPSU Foreign Section, concerning the Sino-Soviet dispute. The delegate was informed of the interpretation the CPSU placed on recent Chinese actions, and Tereshkin asked that he have a plenum of his party's central committee convened after his return home to discuss the Chinese actions at Peiping and to condemn them as violations of the Moscow declaration. A second person, tentatively identified as L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, was also reported present at this meeting. According to a statement broadcast while the Bucharest congress was in session, representatives of the French and Spanish Communist parties held a meeting on 14 and 15 June, at which they reaffirmed their adherence to the 12 Party Declaration. Since the leadership of both of these parties was represented in the group of WFTU delegates in Moscow at this time, it appears possible that the meeting in question took

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place there and that the reaffirmation was a reaction to the Peiping events.

16. In contrast to these cryptic endorsements of the Moscow declaration, on 19 June 1960 a statement by Agostino Novella, a leading Italian Communist and president of the WFTU, was published in the Italian Party newspaper Unita. In this statement, which was also broadcast in Italian from Czechoslovakia on 20 June, Novella described the Chinese criticism of the resolutions proposed at the WFTU Council meeting in Peiping and, like the 10 June Soviet articles, characterized the Chinese views as "deviations." So far as can be determined, this was the first instance in which a Free World Communist party publicized this charge against the Chinese. The appearance of the statement coincided with the opening of the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers Party in Bucharest, where the next phase of the dispute developed.

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The Bucharest debates (20-27 June 1960)

17. The Chinese determination to press at Bucharest for Soviet adoption of a militant line is suggested by an article in the 16 June issue of Red Flag, which, in an obvious reference to the CPSU's earlier justification of its views on peace and peaceful coexistence, observed that "one cannot separate one self from the revisionists merely by stating that the forces of socialism predominate over the forces of imperialism." The Chinese delegation to the congress of the Rumanian Workers Party stopped in Moscow for an exchange of views on 17 June. It presented a letter from the CPC which limited its powers to ~~the~~ agreeing on a date for a party conference to discuss Sino-Soviet differences and ~~the~~ exchanging views, without, however, adopting any formal resolution. The CPSU representatives were not successful in obtaining an admission from the Chinese delegation of the errors of the CPC. The Chinese, however, reportedly expressed a willingness to correct their positions if in an exchange of views with the delegates at Bucharest a majority should "prove" them wrong. The CPSU, justifying its action by invoking the November 1957 Peace Manifesto (not the 12 Party Declaration adopted at the same time), insisted that the views of all the Communist parties should eventually be ascertained before attempting a meeting to reach a final solution. In this context, the Bucharest session should presumably have involved nothing but an exchange of views. The Chinese stated at Bucharest that in Moscow the CPSU had first made the proposal that other parties be brought into the debate, but had wished to confine the group to delegates from the bloc parties only. The Chinese said that they had rejected this proposal. It would appear, then, that the Chinese adherence to their instruction forced the Soviet's hand.

18. ~~While there~~ ^{Although} are reports that the CPSU intended by the end of May to attack the Chinese at Bucharest, the Soviet decision to make a major effort there to enlist the support of other parties appears to have been

reached as a result of the Chinese stand on 17 June. Virtually none of the major Free World parties sent top-level delegates to the congress. The fact that Khrushchev was to lead the Soviet delegation was announced only on June 18, the day of his departure. All the European satellite delegations except Albania were led by persons of national stature equal to that of Khrushchev, but the late arrival of Gomulka of Poland and the early departure of Novotny of Czechoslovakia suggest that this top-level representation was organized on short notice. The leader of the Chinese delegation, P'eng Chen, was clearly outranked by this group. Fifty parties were represented at the congress. Twenty-five of the thirty-five non-bloc fraternal delegations identified as present were composed of second and third echelon party leaders and none of the more significant Free World parties, except Chile and Syria, were represented by their leaders.

19. The Soviet delegation to Bucharest included B. Penomarev and Y. A. Antropov, the heads of the two Central Committee sections for relations with the non-bloc parties, respectively. During the first days of the congress they and their colleagues concentrated on briefing fraternal delegates. It is known that a group of English-speaking delegates and a second group comprising those who spoke Spanish were called together separately and briefed from a long letter which the CPSU intended to issue to all parties. The letter had apparently been either completed or revised at the last moment, for it contained the Soviet account of the Moscow exchanges of 17 June and explained the Soviet view of how the inter-party discussion should be handled. The inclusion of Wu Hsiu-ch'uan, the deputy director of the CPC's International Liaison Department, as one of the four Chinese delegates suggests that the Chinese too planned to exploit their supporters and acquaintances among the delegates.

20. The reporting on the sequence of events at Bucharest concerning

the Sino-Soviet dispute is in some respects contradictory. The following probable chronology, however, emerges from an analysis of the available information.

a. On 21 June the Rumanian party congress began its open sessions. N. S. Khrushchev, in his first public speech to the congress, presented the essentials of the Soviet line and criticized "mechanical repeaters of what Lenin said on imperialism," called such persons "children", and attacked "those who do not understand that war is, under present circumstances, not inevitable." Other public speeches by Rumanians and fraternal delegates, including the Chinese, P'eng Chen, occupied most of the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd.

b. On 22 June P'eng Chen spoke publicly in the morning. He included in his remarks a characterization of recent U.S. actions as a "peace fraud," and he warned that "imperialism can never be trusted." Referring on a number of points to the 12 Party Declaration, he emphasized the doctrinal statements previously highlighted in the Chinese criticisms of the Soviet line. He praised the Cuban and Algerian struggles and said that war could be averted and peace preserved by aiding liberation movements and revolutionary struggles. He also called for Communist unity and the "broadest possible anti-imperialist united front with the unity at its core." He further charged, as his party had done earlier, that the imperialists were using modern revisionists (Tito) to disrupt Communist unity, and he called for a struggle to the end against modern revisionism. He made no mention of "peaceful coexistence," an omission for which he was later upbraided by Mr. Khrushchev. It was on this day that the CPSU began caucusing with the fraternal delegates.

21. Three inter-party meetings dealing with the Sino-Soviet dispute appear to have been held. The first occurred on 24 June, when the Soviet

bloc representatives met all day to draft a communique. No information is available on this meeting beyond a statement that the first draft of the communique was presented by the Soviet representative and that the Chinese felt obliged to refer the final draft to the Central Committee in Peiping for possible amendment. The move to produce a communique appears, in light of the CPC instructions to its delegation, to have been a surprise pressure move by the CPSU. The Chinese delegates were obviously faced with a dilemma ^{me - but succumbing to pressure, they did} sign the communique on the 24th.

23. On 25 June, after the conclusion of the congress at mid-day, a closed meeting of approximately 140 delegates from 50 parties was convened. This second meeting, a full-scale debate, was opened by the first secretary of the Rumanian party, Georghiu-Daj, who read the draft communique. A number of other delegates then spoke, including, at least, representatives of East Germany, the UK, France, and Italy. In fact, according to one source, more than twenty delegates spoke before the Chinese representatives took the floor. The Soviet caucusing and briefings had had some effect, for most of the speakers are reported to have adhered in general to the Soviet line of argument. It is also worth noting that Pospelov, the Soviet representative at this meeting, reportedly did not speak. This tactic--in which others take the lead in a Soviet-inspired attack--is well known and is usually employed to permit the CPSU to have the last word and to appear as an objective mediator rather than merely as one more partisan participant in a debate. When the Chinese representative finally spoke, he attacked the line taken by most of the preceding speakers, charging that it was unrealistic, slanderous, and groundless, and based upon incomplete evidence. He also criticized negative attitudes toward certain Chinese domestic policies and asserted that the reports prepared for the WFTU Peiping meeting had contained attacks against the communes and great-leap forward programs. (See note.)

He refuted charges that the Chinese had not played their full part in the peace struggle, referring to their support of Khrushchev's visit to the U.S. and to Chou En-lai's negotiations with many countries. He also insisted that the Chinese had supported peaceful coexistence, noting in particular their role in the 1955 Bandung conference. According to another source, the Chinese representative also stated that China would stand on the Moscow declaration of 1957, supported the idea that a re-appraisal of the international situation was necessary, and endorsed a proposal that the reappraisal should be carried out on a multiparty basis.

This Chinese reaction appears to have been mainly defensive ; what new facts the Chinese delegate brought forward were apparently selected to prove that the Soviet case was a biased and and incomplete presentation. Pospelov too endorsed this proposal.]

Qte. This Chinese charge is particularly interesting ^{because} since the two main WFTU reports presented at Peiping, by Marcel Bras and Ibrahim Zakaria, did not criticize these Chinese policies. In fact, the Bras report contained two laudatory references to the communes. It is known, however, that on 2 June (i.e., three days before the delayed opening of the Peiping meeting) the Chinese informed V. Grishin, the head of the Soviet delegation, that the treatment of the peace and disarmament themes in the draft WFTU reports was unacceptable and would be openly attacked if the drafts were not amended before presentation. It is also known that these sections were not amended to meet Chinese demands--in fact, a number of amendments actually made in the final report strengthened the WFTU's support for the Soviet peace line. At least one amendment, dealing with the question of Free World economic trade and aid with under-^{as} developed countries, was, in fact, of such a nature/to be particularly unpalatable to the Chinese. It has also been reported that the French representatives at ^{Bucharest} ~~Budapest~~ were particularly incensed with the Chinese for having brought this question into the debate, but no one is reported to have refuted the Chinese charge as untrue. One report provides a

clue to a plausible explanation of this matter by noting that the Chinese said that "such a WFTU report would have been rejected by the Chinese people". It seems likely then that the Chinese charges referred to the original draft of the WFTU report prepared by Louis Saillant, which probably did contain such an attack. It probably was edited out, at ~~Bras~~ Soviet insistence, before/actually delivered the report to the Council. The involvement of the two Frenchmen, Saillant and Bras, in this matter would explain the vigorous reaction of the French delegates at Bucharest.)

23. Delegates at this second meeting received a number of papers, including an 84-page Chinese translation of a CPSU document. This 84-page document appears to be a critical factor in the further development of the dispute. Its existence has been reported by a number of independent and widely separated sources, and at least two reports indicate that it was a sharp, wide ranging, and bitterly critical summary of Soviet criticisms of the CPC. One source has reported that, prior to the Bucharest congress, the CPSU addressed a "strong" letter to the CPC embodying its criticisms of Chinese doctrines and actions, including charges against the Chinese foreign policy toward India and Algeria, as well as charges that Chinese actions were destroying "bourgeois" confidence in Communist desires for peace and arousing Afro-Asian suspicions of international Communism. The fact that the CPSU sent a letter "raising various issues" to the CPC was also stated by P'eng Chen at Bucharest. A third source, describing the contents of the 84-page document, also notes its sharp tone and its charges of Chinese errors in the foreign policy toward India. In addition, this source says that it criticized Chinese nationalism, ^{and} Chinese non-cooperation with the USSR in military matters. On the basis of this series of reports it seems probable that the 84-page Chinese-translated Soviet document

distributed at this second meeting on 25 June was in fact the full text of the ^{sharp} "strong" CPSU letter to the CPC. ^(see above, para 11) If this was the case, its presentation by the Chinese was clearly a part of their effort to "set the record straight," and undoubtedly disrupted the Soviet tactical plans for the meeting. Such a significant decision must necessarily have been made by the CPC Central Committee, probably during its early June meeting, and suggests that the CPC's attitude toward the Bucharest meeting was predicated, at least to some extent, on the use of this tactic. There is some question whether Khrushchev was present at this first day of debate. At least one source indicates that he was present, but there is no evidence that he participated in the discussion.

24. On 26 June came the final meeting, another closed session ^{that} was attended by those present on the preceding day. It was at this second installment of the debate the Khrushchev personally presented his general indictment of the Chinese and provoked a heated exchange with P'eng Chen. A number of reports state that the Khrushchev speech opened the proceedings. The speech was a long one and reportedly involved direct attacks on Mao Tse-tung, comparing him to Stalin as "always thinking in his own terms" and "formulating theories without coming into contact with the events of the modern world." One source states that Khrushchev's speech was arranged at short notice. The reporting on the speech suggests that it was at least partly extemporaneous, with Khrushchev injecting facts, anecdotes, and direct charges that effectively demolished the attitude of restraint, tact, and adherence to principle which the CPSU had previously tried to maintain in the debate. Speaking angrily, with violent gestures, he described the CPC doctrines as ultra-leftist, as dogmatic, and, finally, as left revisionist. He said the Chinese did not understand the nature of modern war, and rejected Chinese protests over the fact that the USSR had failed to support China in her border dispute with India, characterizing the dispute as a conflict

of purely national interests in which the interests of world Communism were not involved. There is reason to suspect that his attack also included charges directed against some elements of other Communist parties of complicity with the Chinese. He attacked P'eng Chen himself, chiding him for his failure to refer to peaceful coexistence in his public address to the congress on the 22nd. In general he apparently reiterated in stronger and less ambiguous terms virtually all the charges embodied in the original CPSU letter to the CPC. Since his speech is described by some sources as a systematic and detailed presentation of the Soviet charges, it seems likely that it was in fact built around the argumentation of the draft circular letter earlier shown to Free World delegates.

25. P'eng Chen is reported to have replied in very heated terms. He said he had asked for a discussion to be held on equal terms, and that the CPC respected the CPSU as an "elder brother" but not as a "father" party. Counter-attacking strongly, he accused Khrushchev of organizing the meeting to make an attack on the CPC and Mao Tse-tung and to cover up a Soviet effort to undermine the prestige of the CPC. He defended Mao as "more in contact with the modern world than Khrushchev, and more active than ever since leaving the government chairmanship." Referring to Khrushchev himself in terms reminiscent of the 16 June Red Flag article, he charged that "Khrushchev's policy ~~toward the~~ is a policy of revisionism, creating illusions about imperialism and underestimating its true nature." Speaking of the abrupt shifts in Khrushchev's policy toward the imperialist powers, he reportedly asked the delegates whether "any conclusions can be drawn regarding Khrushchev's policy toward the imperialist powers." He stated finally that the CPC had not trust in Khrushchev's analysis of the world situation and especially his policy toward the imperialists. Refuting Khrushchev's charges that the Chinese did not understand modern war, P'eng said the Chinese had proved in Korea as well as against the Japanese that they have more experience

than other peoples of the world. He further registered a protest, saying that he had asked for delay in the issuance of the communique but had been told the day before that it had to be signed in the interest of unity. He stated for the benefit of other delegates the instructions under which he was working, and said that if the communique were published without the approval of the CPC's Central Committee corrections might later be required.

26. A number of statements by others were than made in a general discussion. Todor Zhivkov first spoke and gave full support to Khrushchev's position; others, while less warm than Zhivkov, were, it is reported, generally pro-Khrushchev in their views. No one spoke against the Soviet position. Khrushchev reportedly ended the session by saying that further bilateral discussions between the CPSU and the CPC were necessary.

27. A commission (or committee) was set up at these sessions to prepare for a conference to be held during the next November anniversary celebrations in Moscow, where all parties were to present their views. Divergent reports on the composition of the committee have been received. In general they agree that the committee was to involve about twenty parties and that all the bloc parties were to be represented. At least two separate reports state that the parties of Argentina, Cuba, Brazil, Japan, and West Germany were also to be represented on the commission. One of these reports, supported by a third separate one, also states that Italy and France were to participate. Other parties to participate, listed only in single reports, are those of the U.S., the U.K., India, Syria, and Australia. At least one source states that the commission was to be composed only of representatives of the bloc parties. The terms of

reference of this commission are not known. *The Commission has since been called to meet in Moscow at the end of September. A separate CPSU committee has allegedly been set up as well, to prepare a new CPSU document on the dispute. It seems probable that the CPSU is planning to use it in November as the draft letter of 31 June was used at Bucharest, to predetermine the outcome of the conference*

According to one source, Khrushchev gave instructions to the delegates at the end of the session that they were to report back to their Central Committees that a plenum should be convened to discuss the doctrinal dispute, with the results of these plenums to be disseminated at all levels of the party. On the basis of other information, however, it appears probable that most parties did not construe his statement as a command, for ~~there~~ ^{there were} few such programs initiated before the CPSU's plenum of mid-July.

28. The final communique ^{was released by TASS in Moscow on 27 June,} approved by the fraternal delegates was, ^{it was} according to one source, adopted primarily to conceal the fact that the meeting had failed to accomplish anything, but the CPSU, particularly Khrushchev, clearly wanted it as a device to exert pressure for prompt resolution of the dispute. A short and virtually mechanical reaffirmation of the validity of the 12 Party Declaration of November 1957, its text did not in fact clarify any of the issues in the dispute. This became apparent in a few days with the appearance of the Soviet and Chinese ^{signatures of the 12 bloc parties (including the CPC) registered on 24 June, and the} press statements on the communique. The ^{unanimous} approval given by the fifty parties represented ^{were} was to prove the only significant feature of the communique.

29. The principal results of the Bucharest meetings appear to be the following. The Chinese succeeded in making known to a large audience of bloc and non-bloc Communist party delegates their strong exceptions to Khrushchev's policies and some of the less "principled" actions taken against them by the CPSU. They may have hoped that their adamant tactics would create fear of an open split and thus force the Soviets to break down or compromise. Their actions and those of Khrushchev himself left the Soviets and their supporters in other parties little choice but to defend the Soviet position as the supreme authority and policy maker in the international Communist movement and to apply against the Chinese all their influence within the bloc and Free World Communist parties. It would

appear that the final Chinese position was one from which they will have to retreat if they desire a settlement. It is premised that this will be the situation with which the Soviets will attempt to confront them in November 1960, when the world Communist leadership meets in Moscow on the occasion of the celebration of the October Revolution.